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BEYOND POLICE MISCONDUCT AND FALSE ARREST:
EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983

LITIGATION
John R. Williams'
The most common forms of constitutional litigation under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 involve the traditional areas of police misconduct: unreasonable force, false arrest, and searches and seizures.2 The purpose of this
article, however, is to discuss cases which have provided a § 1983 remedy
for other kinds of official misconduct.
I.
A.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

ConstitutionalGroundsfor Malicious Prosecution

The United States Supreme Court confirmed in Albright v. Oliver3
that a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 arises from the Fourth
Amendment. This concept emerged in 1965, but it was not until Albright
that it became more clear.4 Although many courts before Albright accepted the Fourth Amendment analysis, many still re-characterized malicious prosecution actions as substantive due process violations.5 Setting up
Attorney Williams is best known for his cutting edge work in the field of police
misconduct litigation. For the last thirty years, he and his associates have litigated many of
the § 1983 misconduct claims filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut. He and his associates have also argued many of the § 1983 appeals decided
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In addition, as an active
criminal practitioner, his celebrated cases include the Lorne Acquin mass murder case from
Prospect, Connecticut. Attorney Williams is a partner at Williams and Pattis LLC, 51 Elm
Street, New Haven, CT 06510.
He can be contacted at (203) 562-9931 or
jrw@johnrwilliams.com.
2 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 392-94 (1989) (describing example of
unreasonable or excessive force); Ricciuti v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 127-30
(2d Cir. 1997) (depicting example of false arrest, malicious prosecution, and others);
Nelson v. City of Cambridge, 101 F. Supp. 2d 44, 48-49 (D. Mass. 2000) (citing CaleroColon v. Betancourt-Lebron, 68 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1995) for false arrest elements).
' 510 U.S. 266(1994).
4 See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1965) (describing constitutional
violations by prosecutors can support certain injunctions).
5 See Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 339 (5th Cir. 1999) (describing longstanding rule
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the Court's decision in Albright, the Seventh Circuit and Judge Posner
opined that malicious prosecution was not a constitutional tort at all.6
Judge Posner also reasoned in another case that malicious prosecution was
only "a link in a chain showing a deprivation of liberty or property without
due process of law."7

In Albright, the Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's disposition, but through a different analysis. 8 Disagreeing with the First,
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, the Court held that malicious prosecution
cases pursuant to § 1983 arise from the Fourth Amendment and not the
more general notion of substantive due process. 9 The Court made no final
ruling, however, as to whether a constitutional tort exists separate and apart
from the § 1983 context. 10 The Court thereby left standing an overwhelming weight of authority confirming such existence.

in circuit that malicious prosecution is Fourth Amendment issue); Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d
73, 79 (2d Cir. 1994) (aligning malicious prosecution with due process violation); Senra v.
Cunningham, 9 F.3d 168, 173 (1st Cir. 1993) (imposing substantive due process "shocks
the conscience" test); Doe v. Louisiana, 974 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1992) (describing malicious
prosecution as due process violation); Martin v. Thomas, 973 F.2d 449, 455 (5th Cir. 1992)
(describing Fourth Amendment violation); Janetka v. Dabe, 892 F.2d 187, 190 (2d Cir.
1989) (resisting arrest prosecution subject to Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution);
Goodwin v. Metts, 885 F.2d 157, 163 (4th Cir. 1989) (framing § 1983 claim as due process
claim despite freedom of accused during trial); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 343, 348 (3d
Cir. 1989) (finding grounds for malicious prosecution despite multiple amendments cited by
appellants); Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 993-94 (7th Cir. 1988) (explaining
malicious prosecution for continued confinement could trigger due process violation);
Strength v. Hubert, 854 F.2d 421, 425-26 (11th Cir. 1988) (analyzing probable cause required by Fourth Amendment is incorporated by Fourteenth Amendment); McCune v. City
of Grand Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 907 (6th Cir. 1988) (analyzing malicious prosecution for
wrongful arrest); Hand v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420, 1427 (5th Cir. 1988) (reascertaining probable cause post arrest invokes Fourth Amendment analysis); McMaster v. Cabinet for Human Res., 824 F.2d 518, 522 (6th Cir. 1987) (imposing substantive due process "shocks the
conscience" standard); Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(explaining malicious prosecution routed in Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment depending on
facts); Losch v. Borough of Parkesburg, 736 F.2d 903, 907-09 (3d Cir. 1984) (implying §
1983 malicious prosecution action could exist under analysis of Fourth or Fourteenth
Amendment); see also Dunn v. Tennessee, 697 F.2d 121, 127 (6th Cir. 1982); Occhino v.
United States, 686 F.2d 1302, 1311 (8th Cir. 1982); Cline v. Brusett, 661 F.2d 108, 112 (9th
Cir. 1981); Cramer v. Crutchfield, 648 F.2d 943, 945 (4th Cir. 1981); Singleton v. City of
New York, 632 F.2d 185, 204 (2d Cir. 1980); Norton v. Liddel, 620 F.2d 1375, 1378 (10th
Cir. 1980); Colton v. Swain, 527 F.2d 296, 303-04 (7th Cir. 1975); Hampton v. Hanrahan,
484 F.2d 602, 610 (7th Cir. 1973); Shaw v. Garrison, 467 F.2d 113, 121-22 (5th Cir. 1972);
Oakes v. Cooke, 858 F. Supp. 330, 335 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (McAvoy, C.J.); Rodick v. City of
Schenectady, 856 F. Supp. 105, 107-08 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (McAvoy, C.J.).
6 See Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d 343, 345-46 (7th Cir. 1992).
7 Mahoney v. Kesery, 976 F.2d 1054, 1060 (7th Cir. 1992).
8 See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271-74 (1994).
9 Id. at 273-75.
'0 Id. at 275.
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Just five months later, in a § 1983 claim for post-verdict confinement, the Court implied that a Fourth Amendment constitutional tort for
malicious prosecution in fact existed." The Court noted that "[tihe common-law cause of action for malicious prosecution provides the closest
analogy to claims of the type considered here ....

",

Judge Posner and the

Seventh Circuit seemed to acknowledge the import of this ruling and subsequently accepted the proposition that malicious prosecution by a state
actor is actionable on Fourth Amendment grounds.13
In 2001, however, the ever contrarian Seventh Circuit reversed itself, holding that if the common-law requirements for a malicious prosecution action are present, the availability of a state law remedy would
"scotch" any federal claim: "Claims of malicious prosecution should be
analyzed ... under the language of the Constitution itself and, if a state law
withholds a remedy, under the approach ...

adopted by Justices Kennedy

Albright."' 4

and Thomas in
Said another way, the Seventh Circuit still
treats malicious prosecution as a procedural due process matter. The practical result is that in the Seventh Circuit, depending upon the panel of
judges, a stand-alone claim for malicious prosecution may once again not
exist.' 5
Other circuits also remain surprisingly confused in this area. For
example, the Third Circuit stated in one case that federal malicious prosecution actions may be brought on procedural due process grounds or under
1 See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,484 (1994).

12 id.
13 See Smart v. Bd. of Tr. of Ill. Univ., 34 F.3d 432, 434 (7th Cir. 1994); see also

Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 584-85 (11th Cir. 1996). Judge Posner stated in Smart
that:
If malicious prosecution or abuse of process is committed by state actors and resuits in the arrest or other seizure of the defendant, there is an infringement of liberty, but we now know that the defendant's only constitutional remedy is under
the Fourth Amendment (as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth), and
not under the due process clause directly.
Smart, 34 F.3d at 434 (citing Albright, 510 U.S. at 271-74); see lanesco v. City of Chicago,
286 F.3d 994, 999-1000 (7th Cir. 2002) (demonstrating acceptance by Seventh Circuit).
14 Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 2001) (Easterbrook, J.); cf.
lanesco, 286 F.3d at 999-1000.
15 The Sixth Circuit has joined an evolving bandwagon. In Frantz v. Village of Bradford, 245 F.3d 869 (6th Cir. 2001) the Sixth Circuit revisited "the role of state law in defining a section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution." Id. at 875. The court concluded that
under Albright, a malicious prosecution claim may not be separated from a false arrest
claim. Thus, the Sixth Circuit would reject the Second Circuit's view that indictment or
arraignment cuts off damages from a false arrest. In fact, the Sixth Circuit now holds that
there is a direct line from false arrest to trial-related damages, which is not interdicted by
any judicial determination of probable cause. See id. at 877. Judge Gilman dissented and
opined that Albright holds no such thing and in fact does no more than hold that malicious
prosecution may not be analyzed as a substantive due process violation. See id. at 878.
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other explicit constitutional provisions. 16 The court further held that postconviction incarceration - as a result of a malicious prosecution - can not
constitute a Fourth Amendment
violation because it is not a "seizure" in
7
terms.'
Amendment
Fourth
B. Conceptual Differences Between Malicious Prosecution and False
Arrest
The Second Circuit in Singer v. Fulton County SherifJ4 8 analyzed
the nature of a constitutional malicious prosecution action. Currently in
the Second Circuit, malicious prosecution actions stand apart from false
arrest. The court also acknowledged the concept that a malicious prosecution claim indeed arises from Fourth Amendment violations.
Different elements comprise false arrest and malicious prosecution.
For example, whereas lack of probable cause is a necessary element in
both claims, only malicious prosecution requires a "favorable termination"
for the accused in the underlying prosecution. This distinction is an important one: the Singer court found that the dismissal of the underlying criminal prosecution "in the interests of justice" was not enough to substantiate
the favorable termination element of a malicious prosecution claim, even
though such a disposition would suffice to support an action for false arrest.19

Another distinction between the two claims is the availability of
damages. Any difference turns primarily on when the judicial process is
initiated. For example, in the instance of a warrantless arrest, a successful
false arrest action covers damages from the time of arrest up to the time of
arraignment. A malicious prosecution action, however, would cover injuries occurring post arraignment, since that is the time when the arresting
officer's report forms the basis for prosecution. In the instance of an arrest
pursuant to a warrant, however, a successful malicious prosecution action
can also recover damages from the time of arrest until the time of arraignment. A claim for malicious prosecution, therefore, should ordinarily accompany any action for false arrest.20
Malicious prosecution actions also have certain other advantages
over false arrest actions. While both claims could suffice to ensure full
16 Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 1998).
17

Id. The Third Circuit also held in another case that malicious prosecution is not a

substantive due process violation but at no point suggested a look at the Fourth Amendment. See Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 792 (3d Cir. 2000).
'8 63 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 1995).
"9 See Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1995).
20 This is not to say that in all factual situations damages from a false arrest are categorically cut off at the point when prosecution is initiated (either by the filing of an information or in the return of an indictment). See High v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 366 (2d Cir.
1992).
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compensation for injuries resulting from any false arrest (such as lengthy
incarceration or criminal defense expenses), malicious prosecution claims
purvey a forgiving statute of limitations. Liability for malicious prosecution does not accrue until there is a favorable termination of the underlying
criminal prosecution. 2 1 A prosecutor is therefore unable to delay the adjudication of the criminal case long enough to expire the statute of limitations. As a result, the attorney need not decide whether or not to file a malicious prosecution claim before the termination of the criminal prosecution. 22 Similar to a contract approach in malpractice litigation, this benefit
can keep attorneys from awakening in the wee hours of the night. Lest we
sleep too well, however, there is a decision by a Connecticut trial judge in a comparable vexatious litigation case - who recently held that the statute of limitations runs from the date
of the wrongful act and not from the
' 23
date of a "favorable termination.
There are other advantages to malicious prosecution suits. For example, a malicious prosecution suit allows the victim of false grand jury
testimony to avoid the common law immunity ordinarily afforded to trial
or grand jury witnesses. The plaintiff can therefore sue for any damages
resulting from the perjury. 24
C.

Elements of Malicious Prosecution

The elements of a malicious prosecution case, under both the Fourth
Amendment and state law, are that "(1) the defendant either commenced or
21 See Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 2001); Beck v. City of Muskogee Police Dept., 195 F.3d 553, 557 (10th Cir. 1999); Sneed v. Rybicki, 146 F.3d 478,

481 (7th Cir. 1998); Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, 1005 (11th Cir. 1998) (describing statute of limitations in the context of Bivens action); Eugene v. Alief Indep. Sch. Dist., 65 F.3d
1299, 1306 (5th Cir. 1995); Murphy v. Lynn, 53 F.3d 547, 548 (2d Cir. 1995). But cf.

Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 182 (4th Cir. 1996) (explaining malicious
prosecution could accrue before favorable termination if action would not invalidate outstanding judgment).
22 Unless of course you want to include claims for unreasonable force or bail bond, or
you live outside the Second and Fifth Circuits and are nervous about when a false arrest
claim accrues.
23 Balletti v. Alter, 23 Conn. L. Rptr. No. 2, 70 (1998) (Peck, J.), available at 1998
WL 712357, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 25, 1998). This ruling seems anomalous and
probably will not be followed elsewhere.
24 See Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1198 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding common-

law immunity doesn't protect perjured witness testimony of complainant when sued for
malicious prosecution); see also Curtis v. Bembenek, 48 F.3d 281, 285-86 (7th Cir. 1995);
Anthony v. Baker, 955 F.2d 1395, 1400-01 (10th Cir. 1992); White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956,
961-62 (2d Cir. 1988). But see Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) (analyzing grant of

common law immunity for certain witnesses); Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1291
(9th Cir. 2000); Franklin v. Terr, 201 F.3d 1098, 1099 (9th Cir. 2000); Leavell v. Kieffer,
189 F.3d 492, 494 (7th Cir. 1999); Spurlock v. Satterfield, 167 F.3d 995, 1001, 1004-06
(6th Cir. 1999); Hammond v. Kunard, 148 F.3d 692, 695-97 (7th Cir. 1998).
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continued a criminal proceeding against [the plaintiff]; (2) the proceeding
terminated in [the plaintiff's] favor; (3) there was no probable cause for the
criminal proceeding; and (4) the criminal proceeding was instituted with
actual malice. 2 5
1.

Favorable Termination for the Accused

As noted above, an essential element of a § 1983 malicious prosecution suit - as in most state common-law malicious prosecution suits - is
that the underlying criminal prosecution terminates in favor of the accused.26 What constitutes a favorable termination may well be a function
of state law. It is not necessary, however, that the civil plaintiff prevail on
all aspects of the underlying criminal prosecution, so long as she prevails
with respect to that charge upon which the civil suit is based. In Janetka v.
Dabe,27 the Second Circuit held that it was not necessary that the plaintiff
be acquitted of all underlying charges so long as he is acquitted of the one
charge that constituted the basis of his civil suit.28 The charges must be
genuinely unrelated to each other: for example, acquittal of charges for
cocaine selling will not fulfill the favorable termination element when that
charge is accompanied by a conviction for possession of the same substance (in the same trial).29
Examples of the favorable termination requirement can be seen
across the federal circuits. The Fifth Circuit, in a view which probably
would be accepted everywhere, holds that when the government drops
charges against an accused in exchange for something - such as an agreement to resign from a public office - the favorable termination element has
not been fulfilled. 30 The Seventh Circuit, applying Illinois law, employs a
more demanding standard than any other court: for example, a prosecu25 Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 100 (2d Cir. 1991); see Bonide Prod., Inc. v. Cahill,

223 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2000); McSweeney, 241 F.3d at 53. The court explained that the
plaintiff also must show deprivation of a constitutional right. See McSweeney, 241 F.3d at
53-54. The First Circuit followed Albright and stated that malicious prosecution is
grounded in the Fourth Amendment. See id.
26 See Brummett v. Cambele, 946 F.2d 1178, 1183-84 (5th Cir. 1991).
27 892 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1989).
28 See Janetka, 892 F.2d at 190 (differentiating disorderly conduct from resisting
arrest); accord Green v. Montgomery, 219 F.3d 52, 59-60 (2d Cir. 2000); Uboh, 141 F.3d
at 1005 (describing Bivens action); Lowth, 82 F.3d at 563; see also DeLaurentis v. City of
New Haven, 597 A.2d 807, 821-22 (Conn. 1991).
29 See DiBlasio v. City of New York, 102 F.3d 654, 659 (2d Cir. 1996).
30 Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d 856, 859-60 (5th Cir. 1999); White v. Wortz, 66 F. Supp.
2d 331, 334 (D. Conn. 1999). The court in Wortz held that when a charge is dismissed as
part of a plea bargain involving a guilty plea to some unrelated charge, the dismissal nevertheless is not a favorable termination. Conversely, when "there is no quid pro quo," a voluntary dismissal by the prosecution is sufficient to support a malicious prosecution action.
Itzen v. Catalina, 256 F.3d 324, 328 (5th Cir. 2001).
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a
tor's entry of a nolle prosequi is not sufficiently favorable to support 32
3
malicious prosecution action. 1 The Eleventh Circuit in Uboh v. Reno
analyzed the issue in the context of a Bivens action. The court looked to
state law and held the prosecutor's decision to dismiss several counts of an
indictment, after the plaintiff had been convicted of unrelated counts, was a
sufficiently favorable outcome to support a Fourth Amendment malicious
prosecution action: "Actual innocence ...

is not required for a common

law favorable termination." 33 The court implied that any doubt as to
whether a termination is favorable for the purpose of a malicious prosecution claim should be resolved in favor of the plaintiff, and that the defendant should carry the burden to prove otherwise: "We find nothing in the
record to suggest that the prosecutor's request to withdraw all 34drug charges
...

amounts to anything less than an indication of innocence."

2.

Absence of Probable Cause

A successful claim for malicious prosecution also requires the absence of probable cause in the underlying criminal prosecution. The probable cause determination relevant to malicious prosecution differs from
probable cause relevant to false arrest. First, in a malicious prosecution
action the relevant probable cause determination is whether there was
probable cause to believe the criminal proceeding could succeed.35 This
determination is distinct from the question of whether there was probable
cause for the actual arrest. Second, in a malicious prosecution action, the
lack of probable cause is an element of the tort that must be pled and
proved by the plaintiff.
Accordingly, in a malicious prosecution action the existence of
probable cause is determined at a different point in time vis-A-vis a false
arrest claim. Probable cause for malicious prosecution is not determined at
the time of the arrest, but when the defendant initiates the prosecution by
filing a report with the prosecutor, submitting an affidavit, or giving grand
jury testimony. This is particularly true when the prosecution follows a
warrantless arrest. In such cases, the judicial proceeding is not deemed to
have been commenced until the plaintiff's arraignment or an indictment by
a grand jury. Accordingly, the existence of probable cause for the pur31 Washington v. Summerville, 127 F.3d 552, 557-58 (7th Cir. 1997). This line of

thinking would not likely be well received in Connecticut, where even in the Eighteenth
Century it was held that a nolle prosequi "is more conclusive than an acquittal of the Grand
Jury." State v. Stanley, 2 Kirby 25 (Conn. 1787).
32 141 F.3d 1000 (1lth Cir. 1998).
"3 Uboh, 141 F.3d at 1005 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 659-60

(1938)). This situation is the federal equivalent ofa nolleprosequi.
34 id.

35 See Posr v. Court Officer Shield # 207, 180 F.3d 409, 417 (2d Cir. 1999).
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poses of malicious prosecution is determined at the time the judicial proceeding commences (i.e., the time of the arraignment), not the time of the
arrest. Thus, information discovered by a malicious prosecution defendant
(ordinarily the arresting officer) after a warrantless arrest, but before the
commencement of proceedings, is relevant to the determination of probable cause for purposes of a malicious
prosecution action although not for
• 3"6
purposes of a false arrest action.3.

Actual Malice

A malicious prosecution action also requires actual malice.37 Ordinarily, malice in this context is proven by the lack of probable cause for
either the arrest or the prosecution. 38 In assessing whether there was probable cause, the Second Circuit has held that it is proper to charge a jury,
"that the indictment [is] 'evidence' of probable cause, which could be rebutted by, inter alia, proof that the officers had misrepresented or concealed material evidence. 39
4.

Loss of Liberty

The Second Circuit determined that an additional element - the loss
of liberty - is also necessary to establish a federal (but not a state) malicious prosecution claim. Through the evolution of numerous cases, the
Second Circuit made this element quite reasonable to achieve: loss of liberty can be achieved by virtue of mere arraignment, because the plaintiff/accused is required to return to court and comply with conditions of his
pretrial release. 40 As Justice Ginsburg observed in Albright:
A defendant incarcerated until trial no doubt suffers greater
burdens. That difference, however, should not lead to the
conclusion that a defendant released pretrial is not still
'seized' in the constitutionally relevant sense. Such a defendant is scarcely at liberty; he remains apprehended, arrested
in his movements, indeed 'seized' for trial, so long as he is
36

Mejia v. City of New York, 119 F. Supp. 2d 232, 254 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (Trager, J.).

Sometimes during that interval evidence is discovered which demonstrates the accused's
innocence. Such evidence can not be ignored by the complaining party when instituting a
prosecution.
37 See Rodick v. City of Schenectady, 1 F.3d 1341, 1348 (2d Cir. 1993).
38 See Ricciuti v. N.Y. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 1997); Lowth v.
Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 566 (2d Cir. 1996); Cox v. County of Suffolk, 827 F.
Supp. 935, 940 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (Wexler, J.); Tveraas v. Coffey, 818 F. Supp. 75, 79 (D.
Vt. 1993) (Parker, C.J.).
39 Robinson v. Cattaraugus County, 147 F.3d 153, 163 (2d Cir. 1998) (Kearse, J.).
40 See Rohman v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 215 F.3d 208, 215-16 (2d Cir. 2000).

2003]

BEYOND POLICEMISCONDUCTAND FALSE ARREST

47

bound to appear in court and answer the state's charges. He
is equally bound to appear, and is hence 'seized' for trial,
when the state employs the less strong-arm means of
a sum41
mons in lieu of arrest to secure his presence in court.
It logically follows that if loss of liberty can be established through
a traffic ticket, there is also a loss of liberty germane to lengthy and costly
criminal prosecutions.42 Accordingly, when a false arrest has been made,
the coerced court appearances involved in defending a criminal prosecution will satisfy the required loss of liberty element. This will hold true
even if the plaintiff/accused is free on bail bond throughout the criminal
process.
The Second Circuit restated the elements of malicious prosecution
later that same year, but left out the loss of liberty element: "To prevail on
a claim of malicious prosecution, four elements must be shown: (1) the
defendant initiated a prosecution against plaintiff, (2) without probable
cause to believe the proceeding can succeed, (3) the proceeding was begun
with malice, and (4) the matter terminated in plaintiff's favor. 4 3 A subsequent Second Circuit panel synthesized these decisions and held that the
fifth element, post-arraignment restraint of liberty, is necessary to establish
a federal (but not a state) malicious prosecution claim, and that this element is adequately satisfied when the plaintiff was required to return to
court after arraignment to comply with the conditions of his pretrial release.44
5.

Other Considerations

Fraudulent police activity and certain First Amendment violations
can also substantiate malicious prosecution claims. The Fifth Circuit in
Sanders v. English45 permitted a malicious prosecution suit against a police
lieutenant who acquired exculpatory information after an arrest had been
completed. The officer ignored the evidence and did nothing to bring it to
the attention of the prosecuting authorities. The Fifth Circuit held that the
officer had an obligation to do so and that his failure gave rise to a Fourth
Amendment malicious prosecution action.46 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit
has held that a malicious prosecution action may be maintained even in the
41 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 279 (1994) (Ginsberg, J., concurring).

See Cardullo v. Pedevillano, 15 Conn. L. Rptr. No. 11,351 (1995).
Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 130.
44 See Rohman, 215 F.3d at 215-16.
45 950 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1992).
46 See id.; cf., Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 222-24 (3d Cir. 1998)
(incorporating immunity discussion in Bivens context); Reid v. New Hampshire, 56 F.3d
332, 336-37 (lst Cir. 1995) (explaining failure to release exculpatory information triggers
Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution).
42

43
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face of a conviction if it is alleged and proven that the conviction itself was
obtained by fraud.47 The Second Circuit recognizes a separate cause of
action for arrests improperly motivated by First Amendment considerations. In such instances, the arrestee can sue strictly under the First
Amendment and not have to meet the favorable termination requirement.48
D.

Choice of Law for Malicious Prosecution Under § 1983
1.

The Second Circuit, New York, and Connecticut

In 2002 the Second Circuit finally implied that a plaintiff must set
forth the elements of malicious prosecution under state law in addition to
demonstrating a violation of Fourth Amendment rights. 49 This conclusion,
however, was also not always clear.
Examination of the favorable termination requirement readily demonstrates the choice of law evolution in the Second Circuit as it pertains to
malicious prosecution actions. Establishing the favorable termination element of a malicious prosecution claim is critical. Ordinarily, this task is
controlled by state law. 50 Indeed, state courts have a significant interest in
what sort of termination is favorable under their laws. The Second Circuit
initially moved away from this view in 1992 and in Roesch v. Otarola5l
applied what had been a New York standard to Connecticut cases.52
47 See King v. Goldsmith, 897 F.2d 885, 886-87 (7th Cir. 1990) (distinguishing Cameron v. Fogarty, 806 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1986)). The court in King distinguished Cameron,
reasoning that a conviction does not necessarily bar malicious prosecution claims that do
not arise from erroneous probable cause arrests. See id.
48 See Johnson v. Bax, 63 F.3d 154, 159 (2d Cir. 1995) (Newman,
C.J.).
49 See Fulton v. Robinson, 289 F.3d 188, 195 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Janetka v.
Dabe, 892 F.2d 187, 189 (2d Cir. 1989) ("A claim of malicious prosecution brought pursuant to sections 1983 and 1988 is governed by state law in the absence of federal common
law." (citing Conway v. Village of Mt. Kisco, 750 F.2d 205, 214 (2d Cir. 1984))). But see
Goree v. Gunning, 738 F. Supp. 79, 82 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding malicious prosecution not
actionable when acquitted charges related to plaintiffs conviction charges).
50 See Janetka, 892 F.2d at 189; see also Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049,
1051-52 (7th Cir. 1996); Easton v. Sundram, 947 F.2d 10 11, 1017 (2d Cir. 1991); Conway
v. Village of Mt. Kisco, 750 F.2d 205, 214 (2d Cir. 1984).
"' 980 F.2d 850 (2d Cir. 1992).
52 See Roesch v. Otarola, 980 F.2d 850, 852-53 (2d Cir. 1992). In this case
the Second Circuit held that dismissal of a Connecticut criminal prosecution under the "accelerated
rehabilitation" program provided by a Connecticut statute was not sufficiently favorable to
support a federal malicious prosecution action (even though such a dismissal resulted in
erasure of the arrest nunc pro tunc). See id. The court relied on Singleton v. City of New
York, 632 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1981), and Hygh v. Jacobs,
961 F.2d 359, 368 (2d Cir. 1992). The Singleton and Hygh decisions followed a line of
New York authority. E.g., Ryan v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 467 N.E.2d 487, 493 (N.Y. 1984). Additionally, the court in Kramer v. Herrera, 576 N.Y.S.2d 736, 737 (4th Dept. 1991) held that
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By 1995, however, the Second Circuit recognized in Russell v.
Smith53 that, "a claim of malicious prosecution brought under § 1983 is
governed by state law."54 Analyzing New York law, the court set forth a
rigid standard for fulfilling the favorable termination element:
An acquittal is the most obvious example of a favorable termination. In many instances, however, criminal proceedings
are terminated in a manner that does not establish either guilt
or innocence. In the absence of a decision on the merits, the
plaintiff must show that the final disposition is indicative of
innocence.55
The court then held that the New York court's dismissal of an indictment with leave to re-prosecute - a dismissal without prejudice - was
not a favorable termination under New York law.
Emboldening this standard, the Second Circuit later held in a New
York case that, "[w]here the prosecution did not result in an acquittal, it is
deemed to have ended in favor of the accused ... only when itsfinal disposition is such as to indicate the innocence of the accused.,56 Continuing to
cite only New York state cases, the court went on to note that in New York
"dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction ... and dismissals ... for
failure to allege sufficient facts to support the charge" are considered insufficiently favorable to support malicious prosecution litigation. 7 The court
continued: "[t]he matter of whether the prosecution's effective abandonment of a prosecution ... generally depends on the cause of the abandonment. ' 58 Having said that, the court noted that such abandonment procured
by the accused is ordinarily an insufficient favorable termination. Exactly
when the abandonment is "brought about by the accused's assertion of a
constitutional or other privilege ... such as the right to a speedy trial" is a
matter yet undecided by the highest New York court.

New York procedures like "adjournment in contemplation of dismissal" or "dismissal in the
interest of justice" under N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.40 (McKinney 1982) were not "favorable" enough for purposes of a malicious prosecution action. See Herrera, 576
N.Y.S.2d at 737; Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 455-56 (5th Cir. 1994) (explaining the same
effect under Texas law); cf., Harford v. County of Broome, 102 F. Supp. 2d 85, 95
(N.D.N.Y. 2000) (describing no favorable termination subsequent to dismissal in return for
"adjournment in contemplation of dismissal").
5'68 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 1995).
54 See id. at 36.
55 id.

Murphy, 118 F.3d at 948 (citing only New York state cases) (emphasis added).
Id.; cf., Breen v. Garrison, 169 F.3d 152, 152-53 (2d Cir. 1999).
58 Murphy, 118 F.3d at 949.
59Id. This represents a view with which even a Connecticut court would agree. See
See v. Gosselin, 48 A.2d 560, 561-62 (Conn. 1946).
56
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Connecticut courts, however, have a broader view of what sort of
dispositions are sufficiently favorable. In Connecticut, any time criminal
charges are dropped without some trade-off from the defendant, or any
time a civil action is resolved without payment from or order against the
defendant, the disposition is considered favorable for malicious prosecution or vexacious litigation claims. 60 Said another way, if the prior action
terminated without any adjudication against the plaintiff, "[the] favorable
termination prong is satisfied under Connecticut law. Thus, the termination of the underlying criminal action need not indicate innocence merely, it must not indicate guilt. '6 1 Under that view, a dismissal pursuant
to the accelerated rehabilitation statute would be sufficiently favorable to
support a malicious prosecution action.62 Additionally, unlike New York,
the Second Circuit now assumes that a dismissal for denial of a speedy trial
is sufficiently favorable to the accused to support an action for malicious
prosecution.
In the Roesch decision, the Second Circuit refused to follow the
more liberal Connecticut standard for favorable termination. 64 Since
Roesch, however, one Connecticut state-court judge went so far as to hold
that under state law a suit for vexatious litigation can be based upon a prior
civil action in which there was a negotiated settlement (to wit the payment
of money) if the jury is satisfied that the payment was made solely to avoid
further costs of litigation.65
In May of 2002, the Second Circuit at last implied in Fulton v. Robinson66 without directly saying so - that it had finally come to understand
60 See DeLaurentis v. City of New Haven, 597 A.2d 807 (Conn. 1991); Gosselin, 48
A.2d at 561-62; Andreo v. Sakon, 17 Conn. L. Rptr. No. 6, 223 (1996) (holding dismissal of
civil suit for failure to prosecute sufficiently favorable to support vexatious litigation).
61 See Russo v. City of Hartford, 184 F. Supp. 2d 169, 185-86 (D. Conn.
2002) (Hall,

J.).

62 Grasso v. Newbury, 16 Conn. L. T. 18 at 31 (1990). In Grasso,
the Superior Court
held that an action for state-law malicious prosecution could be based upon a dismissal
under the accelerated rehabilitation statute. The court held that the decision in Konan v.
Fornal, 612 F. Supp. 68, 69 (D. Conn. 1985) (relying upon Singleton), misinterpreted Connecticut law. But see Roesch v. Ofarola, 980 F.2d 850, 852-53 (2d Cir. 1992).
63 See Murphy, 118 F.3d at 950-51; Posr v. Court Officer Shield #207, 180
F.3d 409,
417-18 (2d Cir. 1999); Bordeau v. Village of Deposit, 113 F. Supp. 2d 292, 299 (N.D.N.Y.
2000) (Hurd, J.).
64 See Roesch, 980 F.2d at 853 n.3.
65 See Golub v. Holmes, 12 Conn. L. Rptr. No. 4, 107 (1994).
When it comes to

procedure the Second Circuit has consistently agreed with the above jury-oriented approach
for New York cases: "When the termination of a case is indecisive because it does not
clearly address the merits of the charge, the underlying facts must be examined to determine
'whether the failure to proceed implies a lack of reasonable grounds for the prosecution.'..
•Where ...the reasons for a dismissal of charges are in dispute, the matter should ordinarily be submitted to a jury." Ricciuti v. N.Y. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir.
1997).
66 289 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 2002).
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the differing standards for favorable termination between the states in the
circuit. Like the majority of malicious prosecution cases in the Second
Circuit, Fulton arose in New York. As a result, the court applied New
York's draconian favorable termination standard. In articulating this standard, however, the court employed language it had not used before: "In
order to prevail on a § 1983 claim against a state actor for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show a violation of his rights under the Fourth
Amendment . .. and establish the elements of a malicious prosecution

claim under state law.... To establish a malicious prosecution claim under New York law, a plaintiff must show . ...,67 This language clearly
suggests the court understands that the law it is applying is only New York
law and not the law of the entire circuit.
2.

Other Circuits

The Third Circuit also looks to state law for guidance in federal malicious prosecution actions. In Smith v. Holt 68 the court held that a dismissal on purely double jeopardy grounds was a favorable termination that
would support a § 1983 malicious prosecution action. In Hilfirty v. Shipman69 The plaintiff had been prosecuted with her common-law husband.
He cut a deal with the prosecutor under which he pled guilty, and the nowplaintiff received a nolle prosequi. She alone sued for malicious prosecution. Allowing the suit, the court held that:
(W]hen a co-defendant acting as an authorized agent of another party, say his wife, enters into a compromise that provides for the dismissal of charges against her, she cannot be
barred from filing a malicious prosecution claim if she herself offered no consideration in exchange for the dismissal,
unless it is clear that she was fully aware that such waiver
would be the consequence of allowing
her husband to enter
70
into the compromise on her behalf.
The Fifth Circuit also employs state common law. 7 ' That circuit
imputes the draconian Texas requirement that a plaintiff show actual innocence. 72 A plaintiff in the Fifth Circuit must do this in addition to demonstrating all the other elements for a malicious prosecution.
Fulton, 289 F.3d at 195 (emphasis added).
87 F.3d 108 (3d Cir. 1996).
69 91 F.3d 573 (3d Cir. 1996).
70 Hilfirty v. Shipman, 91 F.3d 573, 583 (3d Cir. 1996).
71 See Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d 856, 862 n.9, 863 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining that
"malicious prosecution may be a constitutional violation ... only if all of its common law
elements are established.").
72 See Hayter v. City of Mount Vernon, 154 F.3d 269, 275 (5th Cir. 1998).
67

68
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There is a general common-law concept whose varied application in
malicious prosecution suits demonstrates a disparity in choice of law jurisprudence across the circuits. In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court
(SJC) held in Broussard v. GreatAtlantic & Pacific Tea Co. 73 that:
[Clonviction of the accused by a tribunal to which the complaint was made, although reversed on appeal, conclusively
establishes the existence of probable cause, unless the conviction was obtained solely by false testimony of the defendant charged with malicious prosecution .... 74
This common law rule is enshrined in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. The Second Circuit has seemingly embraced it. 76 Interestingly, the
First Circuit strongly suggested in dicta that this state law rule should not
apply in federal malicious prosecution actions.77 The Third Circuit flatly
rejects the concept as being entirely out of keeping with the intent of civil
rights statutes.78
75

E.

The Underlying Prosecution: Criminaland Civil

In Easton v. Sundram,79 the Second Circuit noted the distinction between criminal malicious prosecution suits and civil malicious prosecution
suits; that is, civil malicious prosecution suits in some jurisdictions are
called claims for vexatious litigation. The Second Circuit held that only
malicious criminal prosecutions which terminate favorably can be the subject of § 1983 malicious prosecution litigation, while civil suits brought by
state actors can not.
However, in Pinsky v. Duncan,80 the Second Circuit dramatically
changed directions without mentioning either Easton or Singer. In Duncan
the court held that a civil suit, under some circumstances, can provide the
necessary predicate for a § 1983 malicious prosecution action. In Duncan,
civil litigants had obtained a prejudgment attachment of assets under the
provisions of the Connecticut prejudgment remedy statute. The attached
parties challenged the constitutionality of the attachments and prevailed in
the United States Supreme Court, which held the state law unconstitu7 86 N.E.2d 439, 324 Mass. 323 (1949).
74 Broussard, 86 N.E.2d at 440, 324 Mass. at 326.
71

See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS

§ 667(1) (1977); see also Lind v. Schmid, 337

A.2d 365, 370 (N.J. 1975).
76 See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 259 (1981); Cameron v.
Fogarty, 806 F.2d 380, 387 (2d Cir. 1986).
77 See Meehan v. Town of Plymouth, 167 F.3d 85, 90-91 (1st Cir. 1999).
78 See Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 1998).
79 947 F.2d 1011, 1017 (2d Cir. 1991).
80 79 F.3d 306 (2d Cir. 1996).
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tional. 8 1 Having thereafter prevailed on remand, they instituted a § 1983
malicious prosecution suit asserting that their property had been seized
without due process and under color of the state law. The Second Circuit
held that such actions were available at common law at the time § 1983
was enacted and that the Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution action
was the nearest available analogy. This decision, of course, not only silently reverses Easton but modifies Singer's custody requirement by expanding it to cover both seizures of persons and seizures of effects.
F.

Conclusion

In summary, Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims are
an essential part of any suit for false arrest. Asserting a malicious prosecution claim will enhance the availability of damages and open up for judicial examination the full range of official misconduct involved.
II.

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND IMMUNITY

Prosecutors, like other public officials, can be sued under § 1983
82
when they violate constitutional rights. The issue, however, is immunity.
Sometimes prosecutors are immune and sometimes they are not. Typically,
prosecutors are immune from civil liability for litigation-related activities. 83 In contrast, there is no prosecutorial immunity for84activities involving investigation, office administration, or press relations.
81 See Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11-15 (1991).
82 See Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 493-96 (1991) (applying and modifying immunity standard under Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430
(describing initial immunity standard). These cases are important markers in this area. The
base concept for immunity is that the prosecutor is immune from those activities "intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. Cases
like Burns further erode this basic standard in certain factual situations.
83 See Manetta v. Macomb County Enforcement Team, 141 F.3d 270, 274 (6th Cir.
1998) (describing prosecutorial immunity for filing criminal complaint, seeking arrest warrant, and presenting to judicial officer). The officer in Manetta, however, was denied absolute immunity for his role in the preliminary investigation and for his order that the plaintiffs be held on extortion charges. See id. A prosecutor obtained immunity for using peremptory jury challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. See Esteves v. Brock, 106
F.3d 674, 677-78 (5th Cir. 1997). A county attorney obtained immunity for ex parte communications with a judge and for attempting to influence the testimony of witnesses at a
related hearing, but was denied immunity for events which transpired while meeting with a
witness during the investigation. See Storck v. Suffolk County Dept. of Social Serv., 62 F.
Supp. 2d 927, 944-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (Wexler, J.). A prosecutor was entitled to immunity
for knowingly presenting false testimony at a hearing because that was part of his role as an
advocate. He was denied immunity, however, for coercing that testimony in the first place,
because that is his role as an investigator. See Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 346-47 (2d
Cir. 2000) (appearing in dicta). A prosecutor is immune for refusal to release evidence
while an appeal is pending, because this is an aspect of her role as an advocate. See Parkin-
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Prosecutors are not immune for deliberately failing to train, supervise, and educate police officers who routinely testify in criminal cases,
when such indifference proximately causes perjury that leads to wrongful
imprisonment. Such conduct falls within the administrative or investigative function of the prosecutor's job.85 For example, the Sixth Circuit has
found that there is no prosecutorial immunity for failing to properly investigate or advise police on the existence of probable cause (especially if this
causes police to prematurely discontinue investigation).86
A.

United States Supreme Court: TriggeringProsecutorialImmunity

In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,87 the Unites States Supreme Court analyzed prosecutorial immunity vis-A-vis § 1983 claims against a prosecutor
(Fitzsimmons). Determined to convict Buckley for the murder of an
eleven year-old child, Fitzsimmons shopped around until he found a witness (the legendary Louise Robbins, Ph.D.) who was willing to swear that
a bootprint found at the scene of the crime was Buckley's. Robbins notoriously testified all over North America that she could analyze crime-scene
footprints and thereby identify both the actual shoe worn and the individual
wearing the shoe at the time of the crime. Knowing that this evidence was
bogus, Fitzsimmons nevertheless presented it to a grand jury. Many
months later, he finally obtained an indictment. At a subsequent press conference he falsely accused Buckley of the crime.88
Buckley alleged that the prosecutor had knowingly manufactured
witness testimony and falsely accused him at the subsequent press conference. Fitzsimmons successfully persuaded a divided Seventh Circuit that

son v. Cozzolino, 238 F.3d 145, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2001).
84 See Schrob v. Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402, 1408, 1420-21 (3d Cir. 1991) (describing
press and investigative activities preclude immunity); see also Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d
1004, 1011-13 (9th Cir. 2001) (prosecutors not immune for acquiring known false statements, filing report against witness, and investigative activities); DiCesare v. Stuart, 12
F.3d 973, 977-79 (10th Cir. 1993) (preserving evidence as advocate); Liffiton v. Keuker,
850 F.2d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1988) (describing illegal wiretaps, unauthorized investigation, and
improper subpoena precludes immunity). Immunity also was denied to an assistant district
attorney for requiring a robbery victim to make a face-to-face identification while failing to
provide protection. See Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 531-34 (2d Cir.
1993). In another Second Circuit case, a prosecutor who enjoyed full immunity for allegedly suborning perjury in one criminal trial was not entitled to immunity for conspiring with
one or more non-prosecutors to present the same or similar perjury. See Dory v. Ryan, 25
F.3d 81, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1994). The United States Supreme Court denied immunity to a
prosecutor who had prepared a materially false certificate of probable cause in support of a
search warrant. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129-31 (1997).
85 See Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 355-56 (3d Cir. 1999).
86 See Prince v. Hicks, 198 F.3d 607, 611-14 (6th Cir. 1999).
87 509 U.S. 259 (1993).
88 See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 263-64 (1993).
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prosecutorial immunity protected both these actions under Imbler v.
Pachtman.89 On the issue of immunity, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
The Court initially remanded Buckley back to the Seventh Circuit
with instructions to analyze the immunity issue in light of Burns v. Reed,9°
an instructive case that was pending at the time of the initial Seventh Circuit decision. Burns made clear that prosecutors who advise police during
investigations are not absolutely immune from those actions. 9' Upon that
initial remand, the Seventh Circuit stuck to its guns and differentiated the
facts at bar from those in Burns. 92
The Supreme Court granted certiorari a second time and further refined the standard for prosecutorial immunity.93 The Court outlined that
most public officials are entitled only to qualified immunity and that only
sometimes do their actions fit within the common-law tradition of absolute
immunity.94 The Court indicated that the standard for whether immunity
exists at all is "determined by the nature of the function performed, not the
identity of the actor who performed it ...and it is available for conduct of
prosecutors that is 'intimately associated with the judicial phase of the
criminal process."' 95 The Court then held that absolute prosecutorial immunity was not available for either advising police during investigations or
making statements during press conferences. 96
The Court has since upheld the Buckley modified standard. In a recent case the Court adhered to the distinction between advocacy and investigative / administrative activities when it afforded absolute immunity for
the preparation and filing of charging documents (an information and motion for an arrest warrant), but denied immunity for executing a certifica-

89 424 U.S. 409,430 (1976); see Buckley, 509 U.S. at 264.
90 500U.S.478(1991).
91 See Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 479 (1991). The Court held that absolute immunity is recognized for prosecutors in their role as advocates vis-A-vis investigators. Accordingly, the Court held that advising police in the investigation phase of a criminal case is not
so "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process" that it qualifies for
absolute prosecutorial immunity. Id. (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430); see also Buckley
v. Fitzsimmons, 952 F.2d 965, 966 (7th Cir. 1992), remanded from Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 502 U.S. 801 (1991).
92 See Buckley, 952 F.2d at 966.
93 See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 259-60, 266-79 (modifying Imbler immunity standard).
94 id.

95 Id. (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430) (internal citations omitted).
96 ld.. The Seventh Circuit went another direction on the second remand and held
that the mere preparation of perjured testimony is not a constitutional tort until that testimony is presented in court (the testimony at bar was not). See Buckley, 20 F.3d 789, 79496 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1085 (1995). Likewise, the Seventh Circuit held
that merely holding a press conference does not give rise to a § 1983 cause of action. See
id. at 797-99.
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tion for probable cause due to the fact that it could have been done by anybody.97

1. Prosecutorial Activity Not Protected by Immunity: Examples
in Select Federal Circuits
a.

Third Circuit

The Third Circuit held in Kulwicki v. Dawson98 that actions of a
prosecutor in the course of interviewing witnesses - prior to the return of
an indictment - were not protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity.
During an interview the prosecutor encouraged a witness to accuse the
prosecutor's political rival, Attorney Kulwicki, of involvement in a babyselling operation. Politics is rough stuff in Crawford County, PA. Additionally in the Third Circuit, a prosecutor received absolute immunity for
conducting civil forfeiture proceedings in court, but no immunity for his
unlawful retention of property after the forfeiture trial. This included his
delay in returning property judicially ordered to be restored to the owner. 99
b. Second Circuit
In the Second Circuit, a prosecutor's misconduct in initiating prosecution, conducting plea negotiations, manipulating bail, and influencing
sentencing were all immunized. Keeping the plaintiff unlawfully in custody for an additional three weeks after dismissal of all charges, however,
was administrative in nature and not immune.' °°
There are many other instructive examples from the Second Circuit.
For example, a prosecutor was found not immune when he advised police
that there was probable cause to arrest the plaintiff during an investigation.10 1 That prosecutor was immune, however, from his decision to initiate the prosecution and withhold Brady material.10 2 Interestingly, whether
or not he was immune for his actions in conducting videotaped interviews
was held too close to call without further evidence. 10 3 A prosecutor's orchestration of a sting operation, and his subsequent statements to the press
about the resulting arrest, were not covered by prosecutorial immunity although they did receive the benefit of qualified immunity on the particu97 See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129-31 (1997).
98 969 F.2d 1454 (3d Cir. 1992).
99 See Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1997).
1oo See Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139, 1151-52 (2d Cir. 1995).
101 See Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653,662-63 (2d Cir. 1995).
102 See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
10 See Hill, 45 F.3d at 662-63.
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lar facts of the case. °4 Additionally, there is no immunity
available where
05
the prosecutor is not acting within her jurisdiction.1
c.

Other Circuits

In the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, prosecutors were not immune
for facilitating a police search of the opposing defense attorney's law office. 106 Interestingly, the special master who supervised the search received quasi-judicial immunity for his role. Additionally, signing an affidavit for an arrest warrant, knowing that there was no probable cause, is
outside the scope of prosecutorial immunity. 10 7 We have seen in Connecticut, however, that when a prosecutor instructs somebody else to prepare an
affidavit, he can receive prosecutorial immunity because he would then be
acting in his capacity as
an advocate (provided he does not personally
08
vouch for the contents).1
In the Fourth Circuit a prosecutor was granted absolute immunity
for suborning perjury before a grand jury and maliciously prosecuting the
plaintiff's lawyer in order to prevent continued defense representation.
These are traditional prosecutorial activities. °9 In the D.C. Circuit, however, a prosecutor was not entitled to immunity for intimidating and coercing witnesses and disclosing grand jury testimony to unauthorized persons. 110

The Tenth Circuit proclaimed that even if a prosecutor is immune to
a damages action, she may not necessarily ignore her constitutional obligations: "A prosecutor may not simply raise the shield of official immunity
and continue to act in an unconstitutional manner without fear of judicial
orders to the contrary .... A plaintiff may therefore seek injunctive relief

to guard against continuing (or future) governmental misconduct." 1"

104

See Smith v. Garretto, 147 F.3d 91,94-95 (2d Cir. 1998).

105See Doe v. Phillips, 81 F.3d 1204, 1209-11 (2d Cir. 1996).

A prosecutor who

demanded that the plaintiff swear to her innocence on a bible in a church - as a condition of
dropping charges - was not entitled to immunity since no government official can require a
religious action. Id. Without the appropriate jurisdiction, immunity can not attach. Id.
106 See Gabbert v. Conn, 131 F.3d 793, 801-04 (9th Cir. 1997).
107 See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 1999); Jones v. Cannon, 174
F.3d 1271, 1281-82 (1lth Cir.1999).
108 See Sheehan v. Colangelo, 27 F. Supp. 2d 344, 345 (D. Conn. 1998).
109See Lyles v. Sparks, 79 F.3d 372, 377 (4th Cir. 1996).
110 See Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
111 Lemmons v. Law Firm of Morris & Morris, 39 F.3d 264, 267 (10th Cir. 1994) ("If
prosecutors and law enforcement personnel cannot be proceeded against for declaratory
relief, putative plaintiffs would have to await the institution of state-court proceedings
against them in order to assert their federal constitutional claims.... This is not the way the
law has developed." (quoting Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of America,
Inc., 466 U.S. 719, 737 (1980))).
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Conclusion

The civil sanctions of § 1983 litigation are virtually the only viable
means of reigning-in prosecutors who have forgotten the Supreme Court's
admonition:
[A prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done ....

He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor -

indeed, he should do so. But while he may strike hard
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one."'
There has never been a time in our history when there was a greater
need to limit the extent of prosecutorial immunity. This would afford
greater opportunities for civil redress to the victims of overly-zealous
prosecutors. The increasing reluctance of the judiciary to impose meaningful sanctions only exacerbates the common notion among the Justice Department and many prosecutors3 that government lawyers are not bound by
certain ethical considerations.' 1
III. ADDITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL CAUSES OF ACTION
Most constitutionally dubious arrests and prosecutions are accompanied by a variety of other constitutional violations. The alert and creative attorney should examine every such case for additional constitutional
causes of action.
A.

UnreasonableBail

Unreasonable bail cases are rarely seen, yet they should accompany
false arrest and malicious prosecution suits. Once the arrestee has been
taken into custody, the Eighth Amendment commands that she be released
on bail bond that is no greater than the minimum amount necessary to as112See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); see also Arnold I. Bums,
Warren L. Dennis, and Amybeth Garcia-Bokor, Curbing ProsecutorialExcess: A Job for
the Courtsand Congress, THE CHAMPION, July, 1998, at 12.

13 See United States ex rel. O'Keefe v. McDonnell Douglass Corp., 132 F.3d 1252,
1257-58 (8th Cir. 1998); In the Matter of Howes, 940 P.2d 159, 169-70 (N.M. 1997).
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sure her appearance in court (absent special circumstances which might
justify detention). Even if the arrestee is able to post the bond which has
been set, a bond set higher than necessary is an Eighth Amendment violation, and any resultant detention is actionable under the Eighth Amendment." 14
Since the plaintiff's personal life and history probably are relevant
to the setting of bail bond, these cases are best brought on behalf of clients
who can stand fairly close scrutiny in a courtroom. Other than that, the
only tricky aspect to unreasonable bail bond cases is determining the identity of the party or parties actually responsible for setting bond. Careful
pre-filing attention to that issue is, of course, a good idea.' 5 However, a
police officer who submits a knowingly false (or possibly even exaggerated) report to the stationhouse, with the reasonable expectation that the
report will be a bond setting factor, could be held personally liable under
the Eighth Amendment. This is the logical consequence of a traditional
tort law concept: an actor is liable for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his actions. 16
Related to the unreasonable bail cases are those cases involving excessive delays in presenting prisoners for arraignment or in setting bond.
Such delays are also actionable. 1 7 Unjustified delay in releasing an arrestee falls into the same category as these cases, although an analysis in
the Ninth Circuit relied on a Fourth Amendment rather than an Eighth
Amendment approach.' 8 Keep in mind, however, that there is no Eighth
Amendment right to immediate field release on a misdemeanor citation
without booking.19
B.

Access to Court Cases
[E]fforts by state actors to impede an individual's access to
courts or administrative agencies may provide the basis for a
constitutional claim ....

Judicial access must be 'adequate,

effective, and meaningful,' and therefore, when police officers conceal or obscure important facts about a crime from

114
115
116

See Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 213 (1st Cir. 1987).
See generally Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141 (8th Cir. 1993).
See Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 351-52 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Wagenmann,

829 F.2d at 212-13).
117 See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 51-52 (1991);
Willis v. City
of Chicago, 999 F.2d 284, 287-89 (7th Cir. 1993); Hallstrom v. City of Garden City, 991
F.2d 1473, 1479-81 (9th Cir. 1993); Webster v. Gibson, 913 F.2d 510, 513-15 (8th Cir.
1990); Lewis v. O'Grady, 853 F.2d 1366, 1369-71 (7th Cir. 1988).
118 See Mackinney v. Nielsen, 69 F.3d 1002, 1009 (9th Cir. 1995).
119 See Higbee v. City of San Diego, 911 F.2d 377, 380 (9th Cir. 1990) (Trott, J.).
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its victims rendering hollow the fight to seek
redress, consti20
tutional rights are undoubtedly abridged. 1
The right of access to the courts has long been protected by the First
Amendment.' 12 "[Tihe right to sue and defend in the courts is the alternative of force. In an organized society it is the right conservative of all other
rights, and lies at the foundation of orderly government.
It is one of the
' 22
highest and most essential privileges of citizenship."'
Withholding material evidence - or even failure to conduct a proper
investigation that causes material evidence to go undiscovered - can be the
basis of a § 1983 action under several legal theories. When police cover
up a failure to disclose exculpatory information or evidence of their own
wrongdoing, the resultant interference with the victim's ability to defend
his criminal case (or prosecute a state civil suit) 1 may be actionable under
the First Amendment right of access to the courts. 23
The Sixth Circuit has held that - at least in theory - a cause of ac-

tion for denial of access to the courts can be maintained by one who had a
potential civil suit, but lost it because the police covered up the evidence
she required.124 The court held, however, that as a prerequisite to her §
1983 action against the police, she must first attempt to pursue that litigation and fail because of the cover up. This First Amendment fight is increasingly recognized by the other courts of appeal. 25 There is also a
growing acceptance that the statute of limitations is tolled until the plaintiff
has first pursued and lost her underlying suit;12 the loss of the underlying
cause of action is in fact an element of the tort.

See Vasquez v. Hernandez, 60 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1997)), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1156 (1996); see also Bell v. City
of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1261, 1263 (7th Cir. 1984); Stone v. City of Chicago, 738
F.2d 896, 898-900 (7th Cir. 1984); Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 971-74 (5th Cir.
1983).
121 See N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-30 (1963); Cal. Transp.
v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972).
122 See Chambers v. Bait. & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907).
123 See Germany v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 17 n.9 (1st Cir. 1989); Goodwin v. Metts, 885
120

F.2d 157, 166 (4th Cir. 1989); see generally McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1554, 1566
(11th Cir. 1996); Creek v. Village of Westhaven, 80 F.3d 186, 192-94 (7th Cir. 1996);
Vasquez, 60 F.3d at 328; King v. Goldsmith, 897 F.2d 885, 885-87 (7th Cir. 1990);
Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804, 812 (5th Cir. 1989); Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967,
971-72 (5th Cir. 1983); Marsh v. Kirschner, 31 F. Supp. 2d 79, 80-81 (D. Conn. 1998).
124 See Swekel v. City of River Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259, 1262-63 (6th Cir. 1997).
125 See Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 79 (1st Cir. 1999); Delew v. Wagner, 143 F.3d
1219, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 1998).
126 See Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2000).
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Most forms of misconduct which would be a basis for reversing a
criminal conviction, if perpetrated by those without immunity, are actionable under § 1983. In all these areas, the constitutional boundaries have
been clearly delineated for years.
Thus, the use of improper tactics to procure eye-witness identifications is actionable, as is the withholding of exculpatory evidence. 27 In
Veal v. Geraci,128 the Second Circuit affirmed the right to sue under § 1983
for a detective's unconstitutional behavior at a lineup and further held that
the right to sue accrues at the time of the pretrial Wade hearing in the
criminal case. 29 A police officer's failure to disclose exculpatory or impeachment evidence to a criminal defendant, in violation of her duty under
Brady v. Maryland, 30 is actionable by that defendant after his conviction is
overturned.' 3' Similarly, a district attorney who threatened to fire an assistant prosecutor (if the latter provided an affidavit to the Governor in support of a death-row inmate's clemency petition) violated the inmate's right
to due process. The fact that the prosecutor
later backed off and withdrew
32
her objection did not moot the suit.
IV. CONCLUSION
All citizens can leverage § 1983 remedies for the misconduct of
government officials. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court in Monroe
v. Pape'33 afforded all citizens the ability to obtain redress directly from
officials who violate constitutionally protected liberties.
The ability of the federal government to provide constitutionally
grounded redress against state officials was perhaps long ago foreseen by
Alexander Hamilton:
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general
government will at times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same
disposition towards the general government ....

If [the peo-

127 See Geter v. Fortenberry, 849 F.2d 1550, 1559-60 (5th Cir. 1988); McCune v. City
of Grand Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 907 (6th Cir. 1988).
128 23 F.3d 722 (2d Cir. 1994).
129 Id.; see generally United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
30 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
131 See Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 221-22 (3d Cir. 1998); see also

Morgan v. Gertz, 166 F.3d 1307, 1309-10 (10th Cir. 1999) (explaining "no harm no foul"
rule applies if plaintiff acquitted); Jean v. Collins, 155 F.3d 701, 710-11 (4th Cir. 1998)
(granting qualified immunity on startling grounds).
132 See Young v. Hayes, 218 F.3d 850, 852 (8th Cir. 2000).
' 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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pie's] rights are invaded by either,34they can make use of the
other as the instrument of redress.'

Within every state, two sovereigns - the state and federal government - reign "cheek to jowl.' 135 Throughout the history of the United
States, this arrangement has led to disagreement, as the actions of one sovereign often encroach upon the prerogatives of the other. 36 Yet this conflict reflects the virtue of the system: indeed, the beneficiaries
of these
137
competing sovereignties are the citizens of the United States.
Since Monroe, § 1983 has been successfully utilized as a remedial
measure to correct tens of thousands of civil rights violations of all descriptions: from high school classrooms to maximum security wings of state
prisons.' 38 § 1983 has been a major force in protecting individuals from
countless abuses by the city, county, and state. 39 Tort claims under § 1983
for malicious prosecution, prosecutorial misconduct, and others continu40
ously civilize the society in which we live and on which we depend.

134 Idaho v. Horiuchi, 253 F.3d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing THE FEDERALIST No.
28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
135 id.
136 Id. (citing McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)).
137 Id.
138 Id. at 361.
139 Hemandez v. Denton, 861 F.2d 1421, 1427-28 (9th Cir. 1988) (Aldisert, J., concurring).
140 id.

